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THE EXCEPTIONS AND REGULATIONS
CLAUSE OF ARTICLE III AND A PERSON'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: CAN THE LATTER
BE LIMITED BY CONGRESSIONAL POWER
UNDER THE FORMER?
MoIs D. FoRKoscH*
Congressional power to fix or change the scope of the substan-
tive and procedural appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under the exceptions and regulations clause in article III, section 2,
clause 2, second sentence, or to deny it any such jurisdiction, has
never been finally determined by either Congress or the Supreme
Court.1 Separately, and in view of the Court's liberal decisions
in the area of personal constitutional rights, but with the current
atmosphere pervading the nation and the Congress, is the clause
to be accorded a broad or a narrow and circumscribed interpreta-
tion and application?
In examining the language of the clause in the light of these
questions there is a preliminary and associated question involving
the Court's original jurisdiction, which may somewhat illuminate
the answers, namely, has Congress the ability to tamper with,
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Schoo- A.B., MA., J.S.D., New York
University; L.L.B., L.L.M., St. Johns University; M.S.Sc., Ph.D., New York School
for Social Research.
'The treatment of the subject matter by Ratner, Congressional Power Over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rtv. 157 (1960),
as well as its tentative examination in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, The Supreme Court, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), do not, however, discuss the aspects now highlighted.
Ratner's analysis will not be repeated; his main thrust is to point up the Court's
'"essential Constitutional functions" (see also last paragraph of text herein)
which, he concludes, cannot be negated by Congress's power over appellate
jurisdiction. I W. CPOSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTITuTION 616-18 (1953), argues
against any possible total curtailment because, at the least, the founding fathers
desired state courts to be subject to the reviewing powers of the Supreme Court.
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e.g., increase, it. This question resulted in Marbury's Cas5e in 1803.2
There Marshall alleged the Court had power to review the con-
stitutionality of the acts and conduct of the other two depart-
ments, but such power of judicial review has never been whole-
heartedly accepted by either Congress or the President in all its
ramifications. All that Marshall legally decided was that Congress
could not enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction so as to permit
it to issue original writs of mandamus, 3 i.e., not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction so as to review lower court decisions; the reason given
for denying this increase in original jurisdiction power was that
the first sentence in article III, section 2, clause 2 limited such ori-
ginal jurisdiction to that specified there and to no other.'
Does the meaning, interpretation, and application of this first
sentence, and its history subsequent to Marshall's pronouncement,
have any bearing upon or influence the analogous interpretation and
application of the second sentence? Generalized, Marbury's Case
"settled the question [of judicial review] ... and it has long been
the established doctrine, and we believe [it is] now assented to by
all who have examined the subject... ."I Of course the quoted state-
ment, in the light of history, is judicial rhetoric and should be
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). One other case seeking
such a writ appears in the reports. In 1817 one Harper moved the Court for a
writ of mandamus to issue to the defendant as register of a land office, com-
manding him to enter plaintiff's application for certain tracts of land, and
citing an 1800 federal statute on the substantive right thereto; the only factual
quirk was a prior like application in the rejection by the Ohio Supreme Court,
which plaintiff said now gave the United States Court appellate jurisdiction
which permitted it to use such writ in aid thereof; the motion was denied
without opinion, the bench including Marshall and Bushrod Washington from
the 1803 group. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 369 (1817). For JOHN
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCuLLoci v. MARYLAND, see that title (G. Gunther,
ed. 1969).
'The famous § 13 of the first Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
"power to issue writs of prohibition.. . to the district courts.. .; and writs of
mandamus . . . to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73.
'By dictum, the Court stated that such grant of original jurisdiction im-
plied a prohibition against its concurrent exercise by any other court. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See on the Court's original jurisdiction,
M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITTMONAL LAw § 38 (2 ed. 1969).
'United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 53 (1851), final paragraph of
Note appended by Taney, and quoted against him by Justice Campbell (McLean
joining in opinion) in a dissenting opinion in Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 478, 505 (1854).
2
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amended at least to "all justice and judges,",, and, perhaps, to
include "many" or "most" writers on the subject;? the open defiance
of the Court's power by several Presidents, 8 and the (political)
questions raised and not yet determined by Powell v. McCormack,9
should not, however, result in any constitutional amendment - at
least so this writer believes. Can we now proceed to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction and state that established doctrine and public
policy indicate that while Congress has a great deal of control over
it still, over some part no such power exists or should exist or be
exercised? Put differently, has Congress the power to control ab-
solutely the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court so as to
prevent any and all final judicial determinations by the latter body
in the exercise of such jurisdiction?
A necessary distinction must immediately be made, namely,
that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction embraces: (1)
problems of (federal and state) statutory (or executive order, or
state constitutional) construction where no question of federal un-
constitutionality arises, and also the actions and conduct of officials
'Even "all," as so amended, is incorrect. See, e.g., Gibson's stinging dissent in
Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825); see also 1 C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT It UNITED STATES HiSroRy 453, 555-56, 740 (1922). But cf. the
strong language in support of Marshall's position, at least where states were
involved, in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
"For one dissenting view to the quotation see, e.g., the late Prof. Corwin's
views in M. FotoscaH, supra note 4, at 38 n.13, and at 40 n.18. Even the first
Congressional examination of the subject decided against the constitutionality of
§ 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, i.e., that the Supreme Court could not exercise
any power of reviewing state court determinations. H. R. REP. No. 43, 21st
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1831). It should also be noted that the House body felt itself(the House and Congress) just as capable of determining the constitutionality of
its own statutes as was the Supreme Court.
'On the views of the Presidents, see e.g., 8 T. JEFFERSON, WoRKS 310-11
(1897) (Thomas Jefferson); 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATEs ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONS TUION 549-50 (1836) (James Madison); Jackson's Veto of the
Bank Bill, in 2 J. RICHARDSON, MESsAGES & PAPERS OF PRESIDENS 576-82 (1896)(Andrew Jackson); Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, in 6 J. RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES &c PAPERS OF PiutsTENTs 9-10 (1896) (Abraham Lincoln); Franklin
Roosevelt's reputed message of defiance if the Gold Clauses had been differently
decided, as noted, in M. Fomsosmi, supra note 4, at 273. See also note 13,infra.i 395 U.S. 486 (1969). If Congressional power under the Exceptions and Regu-
lations Clause were absolute, or at least with respect to the judicial review
ability of the Supreme Court procedurally (on both of which aspects see also
penultimate text paragraph herein, and number 6 thereof), then the Members
could simply act under this clause to prevent further High Court or intermediate
court review and, if there is no original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, with-
draw all inferior federal court ability to entertain any suit by Powell. Whether,
in the light of the 1969 decision, this can now be done may be separately ques-
tionable, even in the light of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
[Vol. 72
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and others under and by virtue of (admittedly) constitutional
statutes; and (2) analogous problems but where are (solely or also)
involved such questions of constitutionality."" In the first area
the Supreme Court has no ultimate and final power, e.g., the body
promulgating the basic statute may thereafter amend,"1 or the
state's judiciary may interpret its local statute, as desired.' 2 It is the
second area which commands our attention. Here, regardless of
whether it be federal or state legislative, executive, or agency or of-
ficial acts or conduct, the Federal Constitution's grants and limita-
" These problems in both areas may arise in all types and forms of suits
between or among private, public and departmental bodies. For example, the
case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was overturned by
the civil war; the case arose on a write of error issued by the
Supreme Court to review a. judgment of the lower court based upon a jury's
verdict. Quaere: if Congress had exercised its Constitutional power to make
"Exceptions" to this exercise of appellate jurisdiction, as it did a decade later
in Ex parte McCardle, would the Civil War have been averted? Would the
Court have permitted this denial of its exercise of appellate jurisdiction? These
hypothethical questions make for fascinating problem-games and may be encom-
passed by the conclusions reached below.
E.g., Anderson v. Mt. Glemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), rev'd by
Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.'§ § 251-62 (1964), discussed in M. FosnoscH, LASoR
LAW 82 n.10 (2d ed. 1965).
"E.g., in Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48,
59 (1922), Chief Justice Taft held that "EAin express finding of unreasonable-
ness by the Commission was indispensable under the statutes of the State" (that
the existing rates were unjust or unreasonable, etc.), and that such lack could
not be overcome "by implication and by reference to the avernments of the
petition invoking the action of the Commission." But thereafter the Kansas
Supreme Court repudiated this federal construction of its state law since the
statute did "not say that the finding shall be incorporated in the order," and held
that the agency's finding "may be . . . presumed or inferred from the fact that
a change is made, without an express declaration to that effect being incor-
porated in the order." Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Go.,
119 Kan. 47, 49, 51, 237 P. 1037, 1039 (1925). Of course for the federal juris-
diction the Taft requirement may hold true, e.g. City of Yonkers v. United
States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944); but perhaps the best rejoinder to this insistence up-
on such procedural formality (not regularity), where not really necessary (e.g.,
perhaps as Douglas felt in this Yonkers case), is supplied by Frankfurter's dissent,
that upon remand the agency would supply the talismanic formula, with a
second review occurring, "thus marching the king's men up the hill and then
marching them down again .. ." Id. at 694. Why Frankfurter then remarked
that "Of course when a statute makes indispensable 'an express finding,' an
express finding is imperative," citing the Witchita case, supra, when the Con-
solidated Flour reversal of this view was unquestionably before him, is a mystery,
although of course Taft's admonition as a general principle is correct (if one
assumes, as Frankfurter did, that such indispensability is present).
4
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tions must be interpreted, 3 and under Marbury's Case it is ap-
parently the Supreme Court which has this ultimate power. Is there
any impediment to, or limitation upon, the Court's appellate
ability so to interpret?
Putting aside all questions of politics and emergencies,14 we are
left with the second sentence in article III, section 2, clause 2,
which states that "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." This sentence in clause 2 is not to be treated in isolation.
It is preceded not only by a first sentence in its clause but also by
a first clause in the same section 2. That first clause of section 2
defines and enumerates at length the instances or "Cases" to which
the "judicial Power 5 shall extend," with a portion of it specifically
referring to three named classes of participants. The second clause
of section 2 in effect then breaks up all these enumerated "Cases"
into two parts, one of which involves the aforesaid specifically nam-
ed class of three participants; the first sentence of clause 2 now
throws this specifying or naming part of the judicial power into
the Court's original jurisdiction, and in its second sentence throws
"all the other Cases before mentioned" in the first clause of the
second section into the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The only interpretation possible, therefore, is that the Con-
stitution grants the Court a total judicial power defined in section
2, clause 1, which total judicial power is divided into two parts
in clause 2; and that one (specified or named) part is granted as
original jurisdiction, and the other part ("all the other Cases"
left) is then granted as appellate jurisdiction - but in both grants
" At first the words "and applied" were included in the text so as to follow
"interpreted," but in view of the Lincoln-Roosevelt defiances (note 8 supra),
and Jackson's famous "John Marshall has made his decision now let him en-
force it," these words were deleted (Jackson's statement was provoked by the
Cherokee Indian land decision in Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
[1832]). Of course Eisenhower's troop-enforcement of the Court's educa-
tional decisions is the coin-face, and perhaps the combined force of tradition,
public opinion, inertia, and the lack of any alternative, is most important.
"E.g., whether it is the Court's original or appellate jurisdiction which is
invoked, a degree of "control" over the judiciary may be found in Congress's
general purse-power, the President-Senate appointing-power, and the foreign-af-
fairs and emergency (or war) situations in which a good deal of judicial defer-
ence is accorded the other branches. See, e.g., the Japanese Relocation Cases, in
M. Foxucoscq, supra note 4, at 161.
" Which by § 1 is "vested in one supreme Court," plus inferior courts.
[Vol. 72
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to the Supreme Court it is the Constitution, not the Congress, to
which the Court looks for its granted jurisdiction, original or ap-
pellate. And, as a consequence, if the first part of such jurisdiction
is untouchable by Congress, so is the second part, save as the
same granting Constitution otherwise provides. Which, of course,
is the question here being explored, namely, to what extent and
degree is the final qualifying language in the second sentence of
clause 2 a limitation so as to enable Congress to tamper com-
pletely with the Court's appellate jurisdiction?
It would be incongruous to say that the Congress has an ab-
solute and complete power to limit and control the Court's appellate
jurisdiction if the language of the two clauses is examined as
above. For the founding fathers could have easily said so by chang-
ing the last two words in the second sentence of clause 2 from "with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make," either to "shall grant" or to "shall grant or make." That is,
if that is what Congress had in mind, but the contrary definitely
appears. 16 Without repeating Ratner's references, quotations, and
discussion, it may not be amiss to add the fact that the Randolph
(or Virginia) Plan, proposed May 29, 1787, in its paragraph 9,
resolved, among other things, to give the inferior tribunals juris-
diction "in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear
and determine in the dernier resort. . . ." the matters falling with-
in the judicial power." Immediately after Randolph presented
his views, Pinckney, of South Carolina, also presented a plan, that
as printed by Farrand is questioned by the latter as being authen-
tic;18 its paragraph 9 contained language which also gave one
Supreme Court both original and appellate jurisdiction. The
Patterson (or New Jersey) Plan, presented June 15 as a substitute
for the Ranlolph one, in its paragraph 5 created one federal judi-
ciary which included "a supreme Tribunal" which was to have
original jurisdiction of "all impeachments of federal officers, &
"Ratner, supra note 1, at 171-73 discusses the work of the Constitutional
Convention and, at 172-73 quotes a proposal, defeated by a vote of 6-2 delegations,
to substitute the words "In all the other cases before mentioned the judicial
power shall be exercised in such manner as the legislature shall direct," which,
as the author states, "would have givea Congress plenary control over the
appellate jurisdiction .. "
1T 1 M. FARtAND, REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 22 (rev. ed. 1937).
'See 3 M. FARAND, REcos or THE FEDEu. CONVEMON, Appendix D, 595
(rev. ed. 1937).
6
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by way of appeal in the demier resort in all cases touching the
rights of Ambassadors" etc.19
These reference add fuel to the conclusions here urged as to
the Supreme Court's constitutional appellate jurisdiction, as
Randolph made the Court solely only one of appellate juris-
diction, and Patterson gave it only one type of original jurisdiction,
namely, impeachment. Randolph included this in the appellate
jurisdiction. (The final and adopted Constitution, in article 1,
section 3, clause 6 gives the Senate power to try after the House
impeaches, the latter authority being given by article 1, section 2,
clause 5). Both plans therefore had their Constitutions granting
only appellate jurisdiction (save as noted in the impeachment as-
pect of the latter plan), and if the proponents of these views had
thought that it was Congress which was to have power to tamper
with this jurisdiction, then their language would have been more
pithily expressive of this fact. This conclusion is furthered by
reference to the Judicial Article submitted by the Committee on
Detail on August 6.20 In section 3 there were four sentences. The
first enumerated the Court's jurisdiction, which included impeach-
ments, among other things; the second sentence granted the Court
original jurisdiction in language identical with that found today in
article III, section 2, clause 2, sentence 1, but also included such
impeachments; the final two sentences were:
In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appel-
late, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part
of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in the manner, and under the
limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior
Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
The finally adopted Constitution deleted the impeachment
aspect; save for a minor restructuring of "it shall be appellate" to
today's "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction," and
now adding to this "both as to Law and Fact" (which was to pre-
vent ambiguities), the Committee's language is identical, and
" 1 M. FARRAND, REcomws OF THE FEDERAL CONvENInON 244 (rev. ed. 1937).
'2 l. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 186-87 (rev. ed.
1937).
[Vol. 72
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its views are therefore entitled to considerable weight. 21 Then
what did its last sentence in section 3 mean? Simply that in the
three sentences discussed above it was the Supreme Court's gen-
eral jurisdiction, and then original and appellate jurisdictions,
which were granted, and so the inferior courts (permitted by
section 1 to be "constituted by the Legislature") now had to be
given jurisdiction; but the fourth sentence's reference to "any part
of the jurisdiction above mentioned" refers to the first sentence, and
not to the second or third, else why the parenthetical exception?
So that the Committee on Detail must also have felt the Courts
appellate jurisdiction to be a grant of the Constitution, not by
the Congress. Thus the only reasonable conclusion from all of the
preceding is that the Supreme Court has been granted an appellate
jurisdiction by the Constitution which Congress cannot do away with
entirely or regulate so as likewise to so do away with entirely, and
that the Court must always retain appellate jurisdiction to some
as yet undefined extent until constitutionally amended.21
On a "conspiracy" within the Committee on Detail, headed by Governor
Morris, see M. FoRuoscH, Who are the "People" In the Preamble to the Con-
stitution?, 19 GA E W. Ras. L. R v. 644, 693 (1968).
This inclusion of "law and fact" jurisdiction aroused the ire of Patrick
Henry, among others, and he, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, on
June 20, argued against James Madison's support of the Judiciary Article by
inveighing against this grant of power to the Supreme Court because it "will,
in its operation, destroy the trial by jury." 3 J. Er ior, DEBATEs ON Tm
ADOPMON OF Tm FEDERAL CONsTITMrrION 540 (1836). Inter alla he then continued:
"But we are told that Congress are to make regulations to remedy this. I may
be told that I am bold; but I think myself, and I hope to be able to prove to
others, that Congress cannot, by any act of theirs, alter this jurisdiction as esta-
blished. It appears to me that no law of Congress can alter or arrange it. It is
subject to be regulated, but is it subject to be abolished? If Congress alter this
part, they will repeal the Constitution. Does it give them power to repeal it-
self? .. .When Congress, by virtue of this sweeping clause, will organize these
courts, they cannot depart from the Constitution; and their laws in opposition to
the Constitution would be void. If Congress, under the specious pretence of pur-
suing this clause, altered it, and prohibited appeals as to fact, the federal judges,
if they spoke the sentiments of independent men, would declare their pro-
hibition nugatory and void. In every point of view, it seems to me that it will
continue in as full force as it is now, notwithstanding any regulations they
may attempt to make." Id. at 540-41. The respected Edmund Randolph, on
June 10, also harangued against the judiciary which "is drawn up in terror ...
I object to the appellate jurisdiction as the greatest evil in it." Id. at 205.
'For practical purposes it is the Court's appellate jurisdiction (federal and
state) which supplies it with that quantity and quality of litigation enabling it
to be in the forefront of change; i.e., a successful Congressional challenge to the
Court's ability to accept appellate jurisdiction since 1954 probably would have
emasculated its ability to affect the nation as it did.
1970]
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss3/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Superficially, McCardle's Case23 may seem to deny the preced-
ing conclusion, and permit one to say that acting under the "Ex-
ceptions" term in the second sentence of clause 2, Congress may
control absolutely the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
this appears to be the conclusion of some few earlier writers.24 This
conclusion and the case, however, have been questioned, 2r and its
facts do not justify its blossoming coverage. The case involved
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas corpus
matters. Before 1867 it had "exercised appellate jurisdiction over
the action of inferior courts by habeas corpus," 2 but this appellate
power "was attended by some inconvenience and embarrassment.
It was necessary to use the writ of certiorari in addition to the writ
of habeas corpus, and there was no regulated and established practice
for the guidance of parties invoking the jurisdiction." 27 To relieve
the Court of this exasperating two-writ problem, and to provide
a decent procedure, Congress, in 1842, authorized an appeal to the
Supreme Court from the intermediate federal courts "in a small
class of cases arising from committments for acts done or omitted
under alleged authority of foreign governments .... 28 On February
5, 1867, Congress now "transferred [this provision], with some modi-
fication," to a general and comprehensive statute bringing "within
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge
every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the Na-
"Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
'See Ratner, supra note 1, at 158 n.3; H. RorSCsAEFER, HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 418, 438, 776 (1939). C. GERSTENBERG, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTONAL LAW 98 (1937), states that "By virtue of this clause and of its
power over the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, Congress has plenary
power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, It could thus
deprive that court of all such jurisdiction and make final the decisions of the
inferior courts." The latter author footnotes the McCardle case, and also a
1936 law review article wherein three propositions are given, the first here
pertinent, "that the Supreme Court may exercise only such appellate jurisdiction
as Congress, by affirmative act, has given it .. " Id., n.82. Compare Hearings,
supra, note 1, where at 14 one of the witnesses did not distinguish clearly between
the power of Congress over the Court's appellate jurisdiction and the different
power to withdraw a pending case (McCardle's facts), giving the impression
that Congress had "an almost unlimited power" in both.
"nSee, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 9, 14.
Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 324 (1868).
SId.
= Id. at 325.
[Vol. 72
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tional Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this
jurisdiction." 29
There can be no question but that these two statutes were
promulgated under Congress's power derived from the second
sentence of clause 2, but under the term "Regulations" and not
"Exceptions." This is a significant statement, for if acceptable then
all McCardle ever decided was that Congress has an unlimited yo-
yo procedural power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction under
"Regulations" - provided, of course, as the opinions examined be-
low indicate, that the Court's appellate jurisdiction is not there-
by emasculated substantively. Nevertheless, the substantive and the
procedural distinction between "Exceptions" and "Regulations"
must not be overlooked, for the Justices do not make careful refer-
ences, but usually point generally to the second clause. McCardle's
Case illustrates these problems.
McCardle, a Mississippi editor, who had been arrested and
was being held for trial by the military under the alleged authority
of the Reconstruction Acts and charged with disturbing the peace,
etc., invoked the jurisdiction of an intermediate circuit, not district,
court, citing the 1867 statute; that court thereafter adjudged that
McCardle be remanded to the custody of the military, from which
he appealed to the Supreme Court; now the authorities moved to
dismiss this appeal and the High Court unanimously denied the
motion. Inter alia Chief Justice Chase held" that the 1867 act did
not require a prior appeal from a federal district court to its
circuit court before an appeal from the latter to the Supreme Court
would lie, but that each district and circuit court "may exercise the
original jurisdiction. . . ."31 The reason was that if the prior dis-
trict-circuit appeal was a jurisdictional prerequisite for a second
appeal to the Supreme Court, then the anomalous result would be
that a district court writ would provide a party with two appeals,
whereas an original circuit court writ would preclude even one ap-
"Id. at 325-26. It may be poetic justice, as the McCardle story unfolds, to
note that this 1867 statute was enacted for the better enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (for details see M. FoRKoscH, supra note 4, at 364-65); the
second McCardle decision might have overturned the Reconstruction Acts and
Congressional program (see also note 33, infra), using the 1867 act as the
vehicle, so that Congress was now compelled to deny the beneficiaries of this
statute its appellate infringement.
I Chase did not dominate this bench. Upon it were, e.g., Bradley and Field,
and in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wail.) 85 (1869), Miller, J., dissented.
"'Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 326 (1868).
1970]
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss3/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
peal. Thus, "If any class of cases was to be excluded from the right
of appeal, the exclusion would naturally apply to cases brought
into the Circuit Court by appeal rather than to cases originating
there." 32
The appellate jurisdiction being so procedurally upheld by the
Court, argument on the merits was subsequently heard and the
appeal taken under advisement; before any conference by the
Justices to decide the merits was held, Congress, because of its
fears of an adverse decision,3 3 enacted, over a Presidential veto, the
statute of 1868. The second section of this act amended the 1867 law
by repealing so much of the latter "as authorized an appeal from
the judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court of the
United States, for the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said
Supreme Court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be
taken . . ."34 As discussed earlier, the "Exceptions" and "Regula-
tions" distinction on a substantive and procedural basis is here
illustrated, for by withdrawing appellate jurisdiction as such the
Congress acted superficially under its "Exceptions" power but,
as shortly seen, really under its "Regulations" power.
Because of this 1868 statute the Court now heard argument a
second time, but this time directed to its jurisdictional ability to
continue with the appeal on the merits.35 In its second reported
decision and opinion (which is the one generally cited and quoted),
it upheld the 1867 act, said it could no longer have or exercise juris-
diction save to declare this, and dismissed McCardle's appeal be-
cause of a want of jurisdiction. Chase again wrote for a second un-
animous bench. He first pointed out that the Court's appellate
jurisdiction was, "strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitu-
= Id.
'The newly-elected Reconstruction Congress met on March 7, 1867, and
among its first acts was the March 23d supplementary reconstruction act of the
preceding Congress (of March 2d, passed over Johnson's veto), both of which
now replaced the civil administration of the defeated Southern states by military
rule. Five military districts were to be governed by five general officers under
Grant, and each was delegated wide powers, invoked in the McCardle case. See,
e.g., the description by S. MORISON, OxFoRD HisroRy OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
716-20 (1965)5 the denial of an injunction to restrain the President from their
enforcement, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); and historic discussion and cases in M.
FoRKoscH supra note 4, at 363-68. Any judicial overturning of the several Acts
would thus wreck the legislative program and, in this "imperious public emer-
gency" (Chase's term, in Ex parte Yerger, 75 UjS. (8 Wall.) 85, 104 E1869]),
the repealing act was passed.
3' Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
'Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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tion'' 3" although Congress had power to make expections to and
regulations for its exercise; thus the first Judiciary Act of 1789
"provided for the organization of this court, and prescribed regula-
tions for the exercise of its jurisdiction." 87 He then adverted to
two earlier cases38s and quoted that in deciding affirmatively the
Court's jurisdiction, the Congress thereby implied "a negation of
the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within
it." ' 9 So, continued Chase, from this principle "an almost necess-
ary consequence"' 4 resulted, that such act "should come to be
spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making ex-
ceptions to the constitutional grant of it."'41
In so commenting Chase did not distinguish between the sub-
stantive withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction and its procedural
SId. at 512-13.
-Id. at 513.
'Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 312 (1810); Wiscart v.
Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869).
"Id.
"Id. In I. KEN's COMMENTAViES 348-49 (11th ed. 1867) the view is expressed
that the appellate jurisdiction was given to the Court "in a qualified manner."
The qualification is that "if Congress had not provided any rule to regulate
the proceedings on appeals, the court could not exercise an appellate juris-
diction; and if a rule be provided, the court could not depart from it." Thus
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is "limited entirely by the judiciary
statutes .. . and to imply a negative on the exercise of such a power, in every
case but those in which it is affirmatively given and described by statute." Four
early cases, among others, are cited, but this writer feels that the COMMNTARMS
are incorrect, at least in the first above qualification before the semi-colon. In the
first such early case, Wiscart v. Dauchy, supra, it is only Elisworth's individual
opinion (at 327) which so remarks, and, based upon the facts and holding, it
appears to be obiter. In Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 (1803), a
writ of error to the general court of the Northwestern Territory was quashed
as Congress had not authorized any such review, but may be noted that a
possession is different from a state. In United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
159 (1805), it was the District of Columbia which was involved, and Con-
gress had affirmatively provided the cases in which review could be had, so that
Marshall rejected any other method (during the Virginia debates Marshall
pussy-footed, or at least skimmed, on the particular question here discussed;
see 3 J. ELUioT, supra note 21, at 559-60). In Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 312, 313-14 (1810), Marshall expressly stated that the Court's
appellate jurisdiction is given to it by the Constitution, subject to being limited
and regulated by Congress, i.e., "The appellate powers of this court are not
given by the judicial act [of Congress]. They are given by the Constitution."
In other words, regardless of any Congressional act or omission to act, the Court
possesses an appellate jurisdiction, but its exercise may be channelled by Con-
gress - could Congress deprive the Court of all appellate jurisdiction? On the
preceding, the answer must be no (see also note 21, supra). For if Congress does
not act to set up a procedure, the Court exercises "powers undiminished." By
acting, Congress may diminish the scope of the exercise of these appellate
powers, but may not so act as to have them diminished to zero - this is the
logical result,
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regulation. In the next paragraph he continued this confusion of
terms by speaking of "The exception to appellate jurisdiction in
the case before us," 4 2 then referring to "[t] he provision of the Act
of 1867 .. " and concluded that "[i] t is hardly possible to imagine
a plainer instance of positive exception." 4 He erred egregiously
in overlooking the following historic facts and conclusions there-
from: as disclosed above, the Court had originally exercised a por-
tion of its appellate jurisdiction by the two-writ habeas corpus
plus certiorari procedure; the 1842 procedural reform, i.e., under
the "Regulations" power of Congress, had eliminated the necessity
for the latter writ from this method of review; the 1867 statute had
later "transferred" this provision from its special use "in a small
class of cases" to a general and comprehensive statute, i.e., still
under the "Regulations" power of Congress; thus the 1868 repeal
of this authorized procedure was again a "Regulations" power so
exercised, and did not affect the substantive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court under its earlier two-writ procedure.
44
Then why did the Court not exercise its substantive appellate
jurisdiction to determine the McCardle matter? Because, Chase im-
plied, the matter had come up pursuant to the 1867 procedures, now
repealed, and the Court's substantive jurisdiction stemmed only
from proper procedural techniques being utilized; put differently,
if McCardle had ignored the 1867 procedures and used the two-step
method the Court would have had substantive jurisdiction. But
would not McCardle have read himself out of Court? A statutory
and proper procedure has to be utilized, where the scope of review is
now sufficient, otherwise, a motion to dismiss is granted - which
impaled McCardle upon the horns of a dilemma damning him in
either situation. Regardless of Chase's misuse of terms, he did imply
that, acting under its "Exceptions" power, Congress would be able
to make specific and express exceptions to the Court's substantive
appellate jurisdiction, and that this exercise of power would ordinar-
ily be upheld. But, it must be added immediately, this does not mean
IEx parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869).
"id. at 514. The full paragraph is: "The exception to appellate jurisdiction
in the case before us, however, is not an inference from the affirmation of other
appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The provision of the act of 1867,
affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of habeas corpus is
expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive
exception."
"Cbnf qPile4deO this in his last paragraph, stating that the 1868 repealing
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that Congress additionally has such power to do away completely
with the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Six months later another case of a civilian arrested by the
Reconstruction military in Mississippi was presented to the Court,
but now via the habeas corpus-certiorari procedure. Eight Justices
again upheld the Court's power so to issue the Great Writ in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.45 Chase's opinion first justified the
Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction as one of the "immemorial
rights descended to thenn" [the colonists] "from their
[English] ancestors." 46 He then continued "[n] aturally . . . this
great writ found prominent sanction in the Constitution .... The
terms of this provision necessarily imply judicial action. . . . We
find, accordingly, that the first Congress" 47 included, in the 14th
section of the 1789 Judiciary Act's jurisdictional provisions for the
federal courts, the power to issue all writs, and specifically includ-
ing habeas corpus, "'which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law.' "48 Thus, concluded the Chief Justice, "It would have
been, indeed, a remarkable anomaly if this court . . .had been
denied!'49 such power.
Next, however, Chase bent the judicial knee to the great Mar-
shall by referring to Ex parte Bollman50 where, as the Yerger opin-
ion put it, the construction given to the 14th section's habeas corpus
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court was that it was to be exercised
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction51 The respect accorded his
predecessor is not worthy in view of Chase's language and, in
effect, his holding. A subtle difference, if not change, in language,
and thereby an extension of power, is to be discerned in the ap-
proaches of the two Chief Justices. The significance of this diver-
gence for the Court's untouchable appellate jurisdiction necessita-
tes its clarification.
In Bollman the 4-2 split between those upholding the Court's
Constitutional habeas corpus-certiorari appellate jurisdiction, and
those denying it, is high-lighted by the dissenting opinion of John-
Act "does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised." Id. at 515.
"OEx parte Yerger, 75 US. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). The habeas corpus-certiorari
procedure is found at 88.
41 id. at 95.
'
T Id. at 95-96.
Is Id. at 96.
4Id.
' With Ex parte Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
75 IVS, (8 Wall.) 85, 97-98 (1869).
1970]
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son. What seems to have occurred is a four-Justice middle ground
position; i.e., Marshall used queasy language either to disguise the
split or else to obtain a majority. Either way, sixty years later
Chase rejected this compromise and went to the extreme of up-
holding such jurisdiction. Marshall's language is therefore impor-
tant. Bollman and Swartout had been separately committed by
the same circuit court on like charges of treason, and each separ-
ately moved the Supreme Court for combined habeas corpus-
certiorari writs. Marshall granted their motions in a combined opin-
ion. He first properly distinguished between the jurisdiction given
the English courts by their common law and that given to our
federal courts by the written law, and then concluded that "the
power to award the writ [of habeas corpus] by any of the courts of
the United States, must be given by written law."5 2 This was a
generalized reference to all federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, for he then asked "whether by any statute compatible with
the constitution of the United States, the power.., of habeas corpus
...has been given to this court." 3 His opinion now dealt with
the interpretation of section 14, that is, whether the writ was to be
issued by any one of the Justices or by the Court as such, and he
then again inquired whether this act which "gives" such power is
"compatible with the constitution."5 4 He pointed out that Marbury's
Case dealt with the Court's original jurisdiction whereas section 14
covered only appellate jurisdiction, and that habeas corpus as now
used under that section was in aid only of the latter type of juris-
diction. 55
Marshall's language permits us to ask why he first wrote that
the power to grant habeas corpus "must be given by written law" 5 0-
for "given" and "law," when so used, may be interpreted as "grant-
ed by a written statute." Later he again speaks of "gives" and asks
1Id. at 94.
53Id.
'Id. at 100. He also writes, "If" this power "is given to this court . . ." and
states separately that one clause in § 33 of the 1789 Judiciary Act "obviously
proceeds on the supposition that this power was previously given, and is explana-
tory of the 14th section." Id.
"'But this point also is decided in Hamilton's Case and in Burford's Case."
Id. at 101; the latter is reported at 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806), and the former
is referred to in Johnson's dissenting opinion in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 103 (1807), as having "occurred... in 1795 ...", while the Burford
opinion (at 449) specifically refers to United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].)
17 (1795).
" Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807).
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if the statute is "compatible" with the Constitution, i.e., in the light
of Marbury's Case, which had rejected a Congressional grant of a
writ (of mandamus) in the Court's exercise of original jurisdiction,
was a Congressional grant of a writ (of habeas corpus) in the
Court's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction likewise unconstitution-
al? Regardless of his answer, the point here made is that the formula-
tion of such a question indicates the views of the questioner, namely
that the Supreme Court had no independent (of Congress) ap-
pellate jurisdiction to be exercised despite the lack of Congressional
authorization. And his reference to Burford's Case as authority, so
as to imply full-bench support, was rejected by Johnson. The latter,
in a dissent "supported by the opinion of one of my [absent]
bretheren," now stated that in the Burford case he had "apprized
[the Court] of my objections to the issuing of the writ of habeas
corpus."5- His present objection, so far as here relevant, was couched
in a general question, "Does this court possess the power generally
of issuing the writ of habeas corpus?" 58 His answer was based upon
the assumption that the Hamilton decision.5 9
[T] he court does not assign the reasons on which it founds
its decision, but it is fair to presume that they adopted
the idea which appears to have been admitted by the district
attorney in his argument, to wit, that this court possessed a
concurrent power with the district court in admitting to
bail. Now a concurrent power in such a case must be an ori-
ginal power, and the principle in Marbury v. Madison ap-
plies as much to the issuing of a habeas corpus in a case of
treason, as to the issuing of a mandamus in a case not more
remote from the original jurisdiction of this court.6 0
Even though his conclusion stemmed from a questionable pre-
mise, i.e., what he "presume [d]," still, as none in the four-man
majority disputed this, the only question would be whether there
was logic in his argument; and here again none disputed him. All
this highlights Marshall's broad language and why, as suggested
above, the Chief Justice equivocated. Furthermore, the forcefulness
of Johnson's argument should have pushed Marshall into a second
declaration of a statute's unconstitutionality within four years after
his first great decision, a palpably unpalatable and unpolitic act.
511d. at 107.
n Id. at 102.
'*United States v. Hamilton, a U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795).
' Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 104-05 (1807).
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The basis for this assertion is that if section 14 of the 1789 Act really
did contain "a substantive grant of" power to the Supreme Court
to issue a writ of habeas corpus,8 ' then its exercise, if it resulted
in original conduct by the Court, would run afoul Marbury's
views; 12 Johnson so felt, contending that in conjunction with sec-
tion 33 such an unconstitutional grant resulted, for the latter sec-
tion granted the Court power to bail a prisoner just as a district
or circuit court had like original power thereby to do;6s and this
argument was never directly answered, was indeed factually accep-
ted by Marshall, i.e., the Court's ability under the act to so use such
a power to bail, and was therefore denied sub rosa.
Chase's bending of the judicial knee in Yerger to Marshall's
opinion in Boilman is therefore error. The latter Chief Justice
never did directly hold as the former said he did, and the latter
furthermore equivocated, understandably, for the Marbury reper-
cussions were still with him. Thus it is really Chase who explicitly
and impliedly upholds the Constitutional inviolability of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, at least in some irreducible minimum,
and who would declare unconstitutional a Congressional statute
removing all appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, i.e.,
thereby permitting the Court to exercise only its original juris-
diction.
The meaning and effect of all these opinions has probably not
received its just due. Besides those aspects covered above, and as
1 Id. at 94. His words were, "The 14th section . . . has been considered as
containing a substantive grant of this power." See also note 40, supra. He never
did get around to examining this statement to determine its accuracy, and
never did flatly accept or reject it. Whether or not deliberately so written, the
opinion can be castigated for its several flaws by those who demand perfection -
but Marshall was, at heart, a politician, for whom compromise was an art
practiced daily. See this writer's views on his opinion in Marbury's Case, in
M. FoRutoscH, supra, note 4, at 36-40.
'Johnson quoted from Marbury so as to support his contention that § 14,
"if it vests any power at all, it is an original power." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S,(4 Cranch) 75, 106 (1807).
Id. at 106. Johnson quoted the clause of § 33 so enabling the Court to do,
and (at 106-07) discussed it and concluded his argument. In the opinion of the
Court in the same case, Marshall (at 100) stated: "The appropriate process of
bringing up a prisoner, not committed by the court itself, to be bailed, is by the
writ now applied for." (Emphasis added). After the delivery of this main-decision
in Bollman, the District of Columbia marshal made a return to the writ and
further argument before the Court occurred, Swartout's attorney requesting bail(at 108) and Marshall, during the argument, stating, inter alia, that "this court,
having gone into an examination of the evidence upon which the commitment
was grounded, will proceed to do that which the court below ought to have
done." Id. at 114. See also his second opinion, and now, after this hearing, (ap-
parently) the entire Court conctrred in diseharging the prisonersA Id, 4t 195,
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this writer reads the opinions and holdings, the Court necessarily
stated or upheld: (1) the Constitutional substantive appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court as an affirmative grant of power
which is conferred by the Constitution, and not by Congress;64 (2)
that this independently held (from the Constitution) substantive
appellate jurisdiction is not derived from the common law, as with
the English courts, and hence is not inherent, i.e., which can be
exercised originally; 65 (3) the 1868 repealing Act indicated no
"intention to withhold [all] appellate jurisdiction in habeas
corpus cases from this court, or to abridge the jurisdiction derived
from the Constitution and defined by the Act of 1789;"60 (4) fur-
ther, that the 1868 Act affected only one procedural method of ob-
taining review in the Supreme Court, repealed the 1867 procedural
reform, and did not effect any substantive exception in and to the
Court's habeas corpus-certiorari method of review; (5) that at
least where habeas corpus is necessary for the Court's appellate
jurisdiction so as to protect a citizen 7 in his constitutional rights,
this appellate jurisdicton must be independent of Congressional
ability completely to except it from being exercised in some manner,
e.g., habeas corpus plus certiorari;68 (6) or, generalized, there is a
'In Ex parte Yerger, 75 US. (8 Wall.) 85, 101 (1869), Chase said that "Thejurisdiction [to issue the writ of habeas corpus under the 14th section of the
1789 Judiciary Act] thus given in law to the Circuit and District courts is original;
that given by the Constitution and the law to this court is appellate." The
careful use of "law" and "original" for the inferior courts, but "Constitution and
the law" and "appellate" for the Supreme Court, is of magnified significance in
the context of these several opinions.
1 Id. at 96-97. By "originally" we here mean external to the Constitution
and encompassed as a power inherent in the Supreme Court; e.g., as a power
to punish for a contempt is when committed in the presence of the court. See
discussion and citations in M. FoRKOscH, supra note 4, at 131-34.
Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102 (1869) (emphasis added). Under
the initial statute the Court utilized the combined writs of habeas corpus and
certiorari.
" Why does Chase use "citizen" and impliedly restrict the coverage, (e.g.,
aliens do not come within the term) unless, of course, one must bend temporarily
so as to assuage Congressional ire and, through "citizen," wave the flag and
point to the freed Negroes for whose benefit the 1867 statute had been enacted.
'In line with the preceding note's comment, Chase said that if the Court
were denied appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases then it "must greatly
weaken the efficacy of the writ, deprive the citizen in many cases of its benefits,
and seriously hinder the establishmtnt of that uniformity in deciding upon ques-
tions of personal rights which can only be attained through appellate jurisdiction
.... " Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103 (1869). Or, if Congress desired
the Negroes uniformly to receive the same personal rights as did the whites, then
the Court's appellate jurisdiction had to be inviolable-at least in a minimum
and irreducible degree.
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"congressional power to thwart the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction through ad hoc legislation withdrawing authority to review
any particular pending case"69 where there remains a sufficient
other method to permit the exercise of the Court's irreducible
minimum substantive power;70 (7) so that at least in one irreducible
aspect theCourt's substantive appellate jurisdiction has to be inviol-
able. Futhermore, and bringing this overall approach into current
events, (8) if the criterion of "one irreducible aspect" is a citizen's
total personal constitutional rights then, although from one point of
view habeas corpus may be said to be the greatest and most indispens-
able of them all, 71 still, in accordance with the modern constitutional
approach, the numerous personal rights and freedoms embraced by
the several amendments and constitutional clauses today qualify
as being likewise required so to be protected;72 and, pari passu, (9)
if the extensibility of these personal rights and freedoms continues
apace, albeit the composition of the High Court may give pause,
then the Supreme Court becomes as omnipotent and Delphic fount
as its here-unlimited substantive appellate jurisdiction cannot be
circumscribed in this area in any significant manner by Congress;
which means (10) that the Court has lifted itself by its judicial
bootstraps, i.e., interpreting and applying its own substantive
(appellate) jurisdictional powers.7 3
While this writer uses "irreducible minimums" to indicate
the point of no Congressional power to except from the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, Ratner speaks of "essential Supreme Court
' This language, which Ratner, supra note 1, at 180, prefaces by "the
[McCardlel case has been viewed as acknowledging the existence of.. ." is too
broad; this has been noted above in the analysis of the confused terminology by
Chase in the McCardle second opinion which is why in the text the concluding
portion is added. The quoted language might read better if it were "ad hoc pro-
cedural legislation," and concluded with "so long as the Court's substantive
appellate jurisdiction in the exercise of its essential functions is not completely
circumscribed." On "essential functions" see also text, last paragraph; we use
the term, irreducible minimums, instead.
"Ratner in effect agrees with this addition, for after the quoted statement
he points this out.
' This is Chafee's view, in 2 CHAFEE, How HUMAN Ricrrs GOT INTO THE
CONSTITTMON 51 (1952), although why this greatest of human rights should be
found only in Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (see notes 29, 33, supra) as a limitation upon the
federal government, and not Art. 1, § 10 as a limitation upon the states is
somewhat incongruous.
'2 See, e.g., M. FoanosCH, supra note 4, § § 324-25, 389, 398.
"While obviously numbers 8 through 10 may be overly fanciful, they are
nevertheless implicit in and not illogically drawn from the preceding propositions
and analyses.
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functions." 74 He begins with the supremacy clause of article VI of
the Constitution and states this requires there be but one supreme
federal law throughout the nation, so that in the event of any
federal-state conflict the former must prevail; this hortatory clause
requires one national tribunal, now created by article III, to imple-
ment its mandate, and so the Court's "essential appellate functions
under the Constitution" are to resolve inconsistent or conflicting
federal or state judicial interpretations of federal law, and to up-
hold the supremacy of federal law over the states in any conflict
with state law or authority. Thus "irreducible minimums" and
"essential functions" do not necessarily jibe; the former compre-
hends the latter, but not so in reverse. The reason is that the
former embraces personal constitutional rights which, as even
Marshall never disputed, must be protected by the Supreme Court,
and in today's climate of opinion there might be a freezing, not
merely chilling, effect upon them if not so embraced by the sub-
stantive appellate jurisdiction of article III. Ratner's extensive ex-
amination of the exceptions and regulations clause is for the pur-
pose of determining whether Congress may utilize it to prevent the
Supreme Court from performing its "essential constitutional func-
tions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal
law," 75 and it is these goals which he uses as "a standard for testing
the validity of legislation limiting the Court's appellate juris-
diction. 76 This writer's standard extends to and includes a person's
substantive Constitutional rights, which Ratner does not touch up-
on. The latter's conclusion is that the Clause here examined "does
not give Congress power . . . to negate the essential functions
of the Supreme Court."77 This writer agrees, save that his con-
clusion utilizes the expanded "irreducible minimums" as here
examined.
"'Ratner, supra note 1, at 160-67. See also note 53, supra.
TsRatner, supra note 1, at 201.
'a Id.
"Id. at 202.
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